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Critical Infrastructure Testbed for Cybersecurity Training and Research
W. Hurst, N. Shone and S. Qi (Liverpool John Moores University)
Abstract
Critical infrastructures encompass various sectors such as energy resources, manufacturing and
governmental services, which tend to be dispersed over large geographic areas. With recent
technological advancements over the last decade, they have developed to be increasingly dependent on
Information and Communication Technology (ICT); where control systems and the use of sensor
equipment help facilitate operation. In order to sustain the ever-increasing demands, it is essential that
these systems can adapt by integrating various new and existing digital technologies. However, this
results in an increased vulnerability to cyber-threats. In addition, the persistently evolving global state
of ICT has resulted in the emergence of sophisticated cyber-threats. As dependence upon critical
infrastructure systems continues to increase, so too does the urgency with which these systems need to
be adequately protected. Unfortunately, the consequences of a successful cyber-attack can be dire,
potentially resulting in the loss of life or a devastating effect on the operation of government services
and the economy. Despite the seriousness of this problem, the development of new and innovative
cyber-security methods are being hampered by the lack of access to real-world data for training,
research and testing new design methodologies. As such, the project presented in this paper highlights
an in-progress project, funded by UKAIS, for the development of an easily-replicable and affordable
critical infrastructure testbed for cyber-security training and research.
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1.0

Introduction

Protecting critical infrastructures from cyber-threats, in an increasingly digital age, is
a concern for governments and private industries. The consequences of a successful
cyber-attack could be life-threatening, compromise military defence, damage the
economy or have a devastating effect on the operation of government services.
Notably, at present, the level of cyber-attack awareness and the lack of threatintelligence sharing between critical infrastructure providers, is a major point of
discussion within the UK and the wider European Union (Walker et al.,) (McDonogh
et al.,).
The increasing complexity of cyber-attacks and the open source availability of attacktoolkits means that security critical infrastructures in a difficult task. Unfortunately,
devising

suitable

cyber-attack

countermeasures

requires

real-world

critical

infrastructure data for both teaching and research purposes, which can be highly
problematic. Real world data is sensitive and often classified, thus companies are
unwilling to part with it, even to aid those investigating cyber-security methods that
may help safeguard their systems in the future. Consequently, this lack of available

data hampers undergraduate studies, MSc projects, PhD and Post-Doctoral research in
cyber-security, and crucially, in critical infrastructure protection.
The Micro-CI project addresses the lack of both access to experimental data and the
hands-on experience needed to properly understand the challenges involved in an era
of growing digital threats. As such, the intended output of this project is to support the
construction of a bespoke bench-top testbed for data generation; consisting of a model
critical infrastructure and control system. The testbed will be used for cyber-security
research purposes and testing new experimental methods for enhancing the level of
security in cyber-critical systems, specifically those under current exploration by the
investigators (Hurst(a) et al.,). In result, the following objectives are defined for the
completion of the project.
•

Construct an affordable and easily-replicable bespoke bench-top testbed for
obtaining realistic data sets for cyber-security research and education. The
testbed will consist of a hackable Water Distribution plant with control system
and realistic infrastructure data output. A full overview of the system is
presented in Section 4. This will result in the creation of a safe and interactive
environment, in which, theoretical cyber-security systems can be tested.

•

To provide freely-available data that enables investigators to test securityrelated concepts, whilst retaining the environmental realism. Simulation data is
often used to test theoretical cyber-security systems; however, data
constructed through such emulators is inherently lacking in realism and a
hands-on learning experience is missed.

•

Use the equipment to share knowledge and expertise in the area of critical
infrastructure protection; aiding students to become employable software and
systems engineers (including manufacturing systems engineers) who are
knowledgeable in cyber-security.

Society has a dependence on critical infrastructure service provision and, through this
project, we endeavour to assess the inherent risks of a successful cyber-attack, and
how this changes vital service provisions, through a small-scale focused case-study on
a water distribution plant.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a background
discussion on critical infrastructures, simulation, cyber-security and related testbed

projects. Section 3 presents the methodology that will be employed for the completion
of this project. Section 4 details the planned application and implementation process.
Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 5.

2.0

Background

As technology has rapidly changed over recent decades, modern society has become
increasingly dependent upon a number of key infrastructures (Merabti et al.,). These
key infrastructures, referred to as critical infrastructures, work together to provide a
continuous flow of goods or services (Eusgeld et al.,). These services include food
and water distribution, power supply, military defence, transport, healthcare and
government services, to name but a few (Wang et al.,). Failure in one can have a
direct impact on the others.
Beyond these conventional critical infrastructures, non-traditional ones have also
emerged, in particular, telephone systems, banking, electrical energy distribution and
manufacturing. Having a well-established critical infrastructure network is often
considered a sign of civilised life, and nations are usually judged by the strength of
their critical infrastructure network and the services they can provide to their citizens.
However, dependence on these infrastructures is one of society’s greatest weaknesses,
due to the fact that a disruption to a single critical infrastructure can result general
debilitating consequences on the population, economy and government (Yusufovna et
al.,). As dependence on these critical infrastructures increases it is important that the
ability to avoid disasters is enhanced (de Melo Leite et al.,).
2.2 Critical Infrastructures
Critical infrastructures are comprised of a network of interdependent man-made
systems that function together to provide a continuous flow of goods or services,
which are essential for economic development and social well-being. One of the key
defining factors of a critical infrastructure is society’s dependence on the services
provided and the loss that would be encountered if successful physical or cyber-attack
takes place.
All critical infrastructure areas are now becoming heavy Information and
Communication Technology (ICT) users; with automation playing a key role in
production (Parmar et al.,). ICT has also increased in areas such as agriculture, food

and water, where control systems and the use of sensor equipment is increasing the
efficiency of production; making it more adaptive to the growing demands (Mafuta et
al.,). For example, the use of robotics in farming to assist with labour-intensive work,
is revolutionising the way in which crops are grown and maintained (Mafuta et al.,).
Infrastructure interdependencies have developed as ICT usage has increased.
However, the risk that a disruption, or a critical failure, in one infrastructure, can
directly lead to disruptions in others has exacerbated. This increase in digitisation and
interconnectivity has also meant that such failures could be deliberately implemented
from a remote location by means of a cyber-attack.
2.2 Cyber-Attack Types
Cyber-crime has a significant impact upon the economy and critical infrastructure
service provision. The various current levels of different types of digital criminalities
have the potential to cause extensive damage. Most cyber-attacks have the aim of
making a profit from either offering the attack as a paid for service or through spearphishing attacks to steal personal financial information.
Paid for cyber-attacks are usually in the form of Distributed Denial of Service Attacks
(Hurst(b) et al.,) which operate as a Botnet, and can be used to incapacitate the host
servers of a business. Spear-phishing attacks rely on human error and a lack of threat
awareness to be successful. Their aim is to trick victims into thinking an email-based
scam is legitimate by ensuring the information inside is specific to that person or
organisation. As a result of successful spear-phishing attacks, numerous military and
private industry systems have been breached in recent years (McAfee et al.,). Each
penetration is the direct result of lack of understanding about the nature of the attack,
which leads to sensitive information being disclosed. Unfortunately, once attackers
have gained an initial point of entry to the system, they can often freely move
throughout most of the network.
The control systems currently used in critical infrastructures systems are
understandably closed source and not publically available. However, such systems
continue to be at risk of cyber-attacks; and the facilitation of essential cyber-security
research remains inherently a challenge.

2.3 Critical Infrastructure Testbeds
Ordinarily, the production of reliable and accurate research results would require the
purchase of critical infrastructure hardware, which is extremely expensive and
impractical.
This has led to the development of specific software-based simulators such as
Technomatix, and the adaptation of existing software-based simulators such as
OMNET++, Simulink and Matlab. These software simulators allow for affordable
representations of critical infrastructure systems, by modelling their behaviour,
interactions and the integration of their specific protocols (e.g. MODBUS).
However, the suitability of simulation has long been disputed; with the argument that
simulations do not represent real world scenarios accurately, as they lack the ability to
model the interactions of control system components. As such, this project aims to
provide a platform that is rudimentary and low-cost to build, but can also be expanded
to cover the various types of critical infrastructure systems. The practical nature of the
testbed aims to provide users with a greater level of realism, and a more accurate
representation of how different events and behaviours would manifest themselves in
real-world scenarios.
As critical infrastructure security research is a relatively infantile subject area, the
existing research is currently limited. However, there are several similar existing
research projects, as outlined below. However, each has a fundamental difference to
the proposed project.
SCADA LAB (Aragó et al.,) is an EU funded project to build a critical infrastructure
testbed with a conjoined security lab, to facilitate security experiments. However, the
primary limitation of this system is that it is a remote access system, with both the
configuration and experimentation carried out by a third party. We are aiming to
produce a localised testbed, where researchers/students are able to oversee and
manage all aspects of their experiments directly.
As the implementation of a working critical infrastructure testbed can be timeconsuming, Farooqui et al., propose a hybrid approach, by combining physical
commercial hardware and simulation software (Farooqui et al.,). However, our project
aims to be as realistic as possible, so we will be fully implementing working control

devices, rather than relying on simulation software. Additionally, we will be utilising
small-scale, and therefore portable, hardware; rather than rigid commercial hardware.
There are several existing proposals for critical infrastructure testbed architectures,
which focus on specific systems, such as electricity substations (Wei et al.,).
However, our long-term goal is not to constrain our testbed to a single role, but to
adopt a modular approach; whereby new critical infrastructure roles can be integrated
at a later stage. This would make it suitable and useful to a wider audience.
Specifically, the proposed system focuses on a water distribution plant; however, the
design is extendable and can be extended to incorporate other infrastructure types,
such as an ecologically-aware power plant.
A framework has also been proposed to address the problem of simulating large-scale
critical infrastructure systems on a localised testbed. This framework acts as a glue
layer between distributed and hybrid simulation of components and targets (Ficco et
al.,). However, at this early stage of the project, we are primarily concerned with the
practical realism and reliability of the generated results.
The testbed proposed in by Morris et al., is the most similar existing research in terms
of its design, and pedagogical and research purposes (Morris et al.,) . The research put
forwards proposes a testbed that focuses on cyber-security and utilises miniature
hardware for a realistic representation of critical infrastructures. However, both
projects are only available locally at the authors’ institution and are not easily
replicable. A defining factor of this project is to develop a testbed, which is cheap and
easily replicable for other institutions. The design and implementation will both be
detailed in publications and make accessible during the dissemination process.

3. Methodology
Dependence on the critical infrastructure is one of society’s greatest weaknesses.
Disruption to a single critical infrastructure can have a far-reaching impact on various
critical aspects of modern life. As dependence on these critical infrastructures
increases, it is important that society’s ability to avoid disasters is enhanced.
Traditionally, protecting against environmental threats was the main focus of critical
infrastructure preservation. Now, with the emergence of sophisticated cyber-attacks,
the focus has changed to critical infrastructure protection as they are facing a different
danger, with potentially debilitating consequences. Current security techniques are

struggling to keep up to date with the sheer volume of innovative and emerging
attacks; therefore, considering fresh and adaptive solutions to existing computer
security approaches is crucial. Consequently, critical infrastructure data is a necessity
in a research environment, which relies on realistic information to design and develop
advanced cyber-protection systems.
3.1 Approach and Contribution
This research project supports the current lack of access to infrastructure data. In that
respect, the key novelty of this project is the development of a platform that can be
expanded to cover the various types of critical infrastructure systems. However, this
project will also make the following specific methodological contributions to
academic knowledge:
•

The facilitation of cyber-security systems testing in a realistic environment
outside of a simulation situation.

•

The construction of realistic datasets that will be used for enhancing cybersecurity development; proof of concept; testing of theoretic systems and
evaluating innovative systems with high levels of accuracy.

•

Academic knowledge will be furthered through the publication of the testbed
construction and the freely-available datasets to enable other researchers to
test theoretical models. The design will be for a replicable testbed to allow
other institutions to implement the model.

•

The testbed data will enable an assessment of potential critical infrastructure
failures on society, through the evaluation of the cascading effects on the
system and an assessment of existing system weaknesses, in terms of cybersecurity.

•

The testing of the technological phenomena of critical infrastructure cascading
failure in a realistic environment will provide an academic assessment of how
cascading effects spread through an infrastructure.

4. Application
The main specific practical applications include the construction of a Critical
Infrastructure Testbed and development of a Data Warehouse. The development of

the testbed will involve bespoke lab equipment in order to construct a Water-based
critical infrastructure model, which will be bench-top size. The components will
include a Human Machine Interface (control system) with an Ethernet port; pipe work
for water flow and controller devices.
4.1 Construction Equipment
Specifically, the equipment used for construction will initially include: three control
devices (one for the overall system control software, one for water control and one for
hacking); a power source (solar panels); water pumps; water and light sensors; display
screens; liquid flow sensors; weight sensors and an electronic platform to act as an
end user for the water distribution.
The design displayed below, in Figure 1, presents a water-production plant. The
specification is modest, meaning there is scope for future expansion; yet is sufficient
in size to produce realistic infrastructure behaviour datasets for research purposes.
The design is extendable to other applications in that it can be connected to other
critical infrastructure models (such as power plants, telecommunications etc.), if
additional equipment is to be included.
Water Level Sensors

Piping
End User
Water Tank 2

Water Tank 1

Water Source

Water Flow Sensors
Pump 1

Pump 2

RTU/Control

RTU/Control

Battery – Energy Store

Solar Station – Power Source

Switch

Firewall

User

User Interface and SCADA

Interface & CyberAttack Source

Data Store

Figure 1. System Framework (Conceptual)

End User Interface

This would enable future research projects investigating the effect of cascading
failures throughout a network of critical infrastructures, and its repercussive effects
upon society.
4.2 Practical Output
The aim of the research is to have a threefold practical output; a fully working critical
infrastructure testbed, a data store for research purposes and a prototype cybersecurity system based on the investigators’ theoretical research. The data server
consists of a NAS (Network Attached Storage) device used to host the data repository.
Both the data format and accessibility will ensure that it is usable for other academic
researchers. Specifically, the data store will be constructed using a Synology
DiskStation DS215j 2 Bay Desktop Network Attached Storage, which is able to store
4TB of research data, but this can be expanded at a later date if necessary. By using
this approach, other researchers will be able to upload their own data generated to the
server. This will not only enhance the utility of the system progressively over time,
but also provide a repository of data to support experimental repeatability.
Model critical infrastructure testbeds are sparse in the UK. Completing this project
would provide research and teaching opportunities for the testing and development of
security enhancements in a real-life scenario. It is also clear that the practical
approach of the equipment will provide significant benefits in terms increasing the
employability of students, through applicable knowledge and the scope for R&D
collaboration.
4.3 Project Completion Stages
The proposed research project will be done through 4 stages, each with their own
techniques and methods for completion. The research approach is detailed as follows:
•

Stage 1 - Design and Construction of Testbed: This will be a practical process
with the aim of bringing field research into the lab environment for
Information Systems data analysis and collection. The procedure will involve
a hands-on assembly of the critical infrastructure model, presented in Section
4. The specific HMI is provided through a Windows tablet; the control
devices/RTUs are Arduino boards with Ethernet shields; Arduino compatible
pumps are used to move the water round the system, which is constructed

from plastic piping. Bespoke components, such as the end-user houses, will be
3D printed. The sensors consist of Arduino compatible water and pressure
sensors. The power is supplied by a battery charged by solar panels. The
overall construction process will involve simple wiring processes to connect
the Arduino to the components through the use of a breadboard. An Ethernet
switch will connect all the control devices to the User Interface. The control
system software will be Arduino compatible.
•

Stage 2 - Generation of Data: Realistic critical infrastructure datasets will be
created, containing varied information, based on the run-time conditions.
During system operation, data can be collected from any of the system
components. This is comparable with the collection of data from mechanisms
(such as a pump or sensors) in a real critical infrastructure environment. The
aim will be to support data collection through sensors, which provide the RTU
components with information to feed back to the User Interface. The research
methodology will involve a case-study process to identify the most realistic
approach for data generation, based on the existing research presented in the
background section. The subsequent process of qualitative data generation,
involves interacting with the data source to produce high-quality research data.

•

Stage 3 - Cyber-Attack, Data Research & Security Systems: The output of
stage 1 and 2 will lead to state-of-the-art cyber-security and data analysis
investigations. Specifically, first-hand experience of security systems will
enable the investigators to assess the effectiveness of existing anti-malware
systems, which use techniques such as signature-based detection, anomaly
detection and protocol analysis. This will, effectively, enable field-work to
take place in a research lab environment. Critical infrastructure security is
referred to as having a hard outer shell with a soft gooey centre (Knapp et al.,).
The subsequent results will be used to devise and test theoretical cybersecurity devices for enhancing the weaker internal state of critical
infrastructure security. Devised security systems will incorporate the use of
advanced machine learning techniques to analyse data. The approach will
involve specific data classification techniques including: Uncorrelated Normal
Density based Classifier (UDC), Quadratic Discriminant Classifier (QDC),
Linear Discriminant Classifier (LDC), Polynomial Classifier (PLOYC), k-

Nearest Neighbour (KNNC), Decision Tree (TREEC), Parzen Classifier
(PARZENC), Support Vector Classifier (SVC) and Naïve Bayes Classifier
(NAIVEBC). To date, the investigators have conducted research into the use
of data classification for behavioural analysis in a critical infrastructure system
(Hurst(a) et al.,). However, the results are based on simulation data and not put
into practice in a real-life environment. This project will provide an
opportunity to build on existing research and test out theoretical results in a
realistic environment.
•

Stage 4 – Societal Impact: Networks of interconnected critical infrastructures
are the supporting mechanisms and pillars of every industrialised nation.
Heavily interconnected and mutually reliant on each other, their service
provisions often cross borders, and multiple countries can consider the same
infrastructure as critical. However, this reliance is also a great weakness.
Infrastructure interdependence means that failures are able to cascade and
impact vital service provision. Understanding the implications of a cascading
failure, remains a key challenge. Consequently, this testbed will allow for
experimentation into finding an approach to identify the effects of cascading
failures and how their effects can be mitigated. This will be achieved through
a behavioural analysis of the system under cyber-attack using the datasets
constructed.

5. Conclusion and Future Work
One of the main challenges for governments around the globe is the need to improve
the level of awareness for citizens and businesses about the threats that exist in
cyberspace. The arrival of new information technologies has resulted in different
types of criminal activities, which previously did not exist, with the potential to cause
extensive damage to internal markets.
Given the fact that the Internet is boundary-less, it makes it difficult to identify where
attacks originate from and how to counter them. Improving the level of support for
security systems helps with the evolution of defences against cyber-attacks. This
project supports the development of critical infrastructure security research, in the
fight against a growing threat from the digital domain. The research project will
further knowledge and understanding of Information Systems; specifically acting as a

facilitator for cyber-security research. In our future work, we will publish the
constructed testbed and make the datasets available for cyber-security and critical
infrastructure research.
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